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Abstract
ENGLISH: In this paper, we discuss advantages and limits of two
alternative methodologies which can be used for measuring inequal-
ity of educational opportunities, both of which are based on Roemer
(1998). The two alternatives re
ect the usual opposition between a
dominance approach and an approach based on specic indices. We
provide illustrations using Brazilian data. The dominance analysis re-
veals a situation of evident inequality of opportunity when types are
dened in terms of parental education, while when types are dened
in terms of skin color we obtain both inequality of opportunity and (at
least weak) equality of opportunity, depending on the types we com-
pare. The inequality indices approach shows that, according to the
parameters we employ, inequality of opportunity represents 16.1% of
overall inequality in Brazil, and we observe large regional variation.
PORTUGU^ ES: Neste artigo, discutem-se vantagens e limites de dois
m etodos alternativos de mensura c~ ao de desigualdades de oportunidades
educacionais, ambas as quais se baseiam em Roemer (1998). Tais alter-
nativas re
etem a oposi c~ ao usual entre uma abordagens de domin^ ancia
e aquelas baseadas em  ndices espec cos. Apresentamos ilustra c~ oes
usando dados brasileiros (do SAEB). A an alise de domin^ ancia rev-
ela uma situa c~ ao de evidente desigualdade de oportunidades quando
os tipos s~ ao denidos em termos de n vel de educa c~ ao dos pais, en-
quanto no caso em que se denem por meio da cor da pele, obt^ em-se
tanto desigualdade de oportunidades como igualdade de oportunidades
(fraca), em fun c~ ao dos tipoes que estejam sendo comparados. A abor-
dagem baseada em ndices de desigualdade mostra que, de acordo com
os par^ ametros usados, a desigualdade de oportunidades representa ao
menos 16.1% da desigualdade total no Brasil, e se observam substan-
ciais varia c~ oes regionais.
JEL classication: D63, I21, I39.
Key-words/palavras-chave: equality of opportunity, education fair-
ness, inequality measurement, opportunity measurement / igualdade
de oportunidades, justi ca educacional, medidas de desigualdade, me-
didas de oportunidade.
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we discuss dierent methodologies for measuring and
comparing inequality of educational opportunities which are based on,
or try to go beyond, Roemer (1998). To do so, we apply a distributional
analysis toolbox to subsets of the Brazilian pupils' population (groups
or types). We measure and compare inequality of educational opportu-
nities across groups or types of pupils, instead of gross inequalities as
it is usually done.
Just after this introduction, we provide a methodological discus-
sion (section 2) of two dierent procedures for measuring inequality of
educational opportunity, reviving the usual divide between dominance
analysis versus specic inequality indices approach. Illustrations of
those methodologies are reported in section 3, where we employ a par-
ticular Brazil's education dataset (the so-called SAEB). The dominance
analysis reveals a situation of evident inequality of opportunity when
types are dened in terms of parental education, while when types are
dened in terms of skin color we obtain both inequality of opportunity
and (at least weak) equality of opportunity, depending on the types
we compare. The inequality indices approach shows that, according to
the parameters we employ, inequality of opportunity represents 16.07%
of overall inequality in Brazil. We observe large variation across re-
gions, just as in the Italian study we use as a benchmark. Brazil's
most opportunity-unequal region (South-East) is 176.67% more un-
equal than Italy's most opportunity-unequal region (Center-South) and
433.71% more so than Italy's least opportunity-unequal region (North).
Section 4 brings nal remarks.
2 Methodological issues
2.1 Recipient unit, attribute, and aggregation method
In this chapter, we take pupils as the recipient units, and the absolute
scores they obtain as attributes. As for the aggregation method, we
would like to use a procedure which, while respecting usual properties,
would also be as compatible as possible, with the conception of justice
stated by Roemer (1998), described along this section 2.
We discuss two alternative paths for comparing distributions in
terms of their inequality of opportunity, both of which do respect stan-
dard properties, and are inspired by Roemer's normative criterion. In
order to attenuate the inconveniences of the anonymity property, the
population is subdivided in groups (\types" in Roemer's terminology),
and usual inequality measurement tools are applied to those subgroups.
One of theses paths has been developed in a series of papers: Per-
agine (1999, 2002, 2004b,a) and especially Checchi and Peragine (2005).
The alternative path has been developed by a group of French economists:
Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005); Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy
(2006).
While both strategies are clearly inspired by the work of Roemer,
2there is a net dierence between them, which revives the usual dis-
tinction between dominance analysis and inequality indices approach.
The procedure developed by the Italian economists is an interesting
translation of Roemer's intuition: it is based on the use of inequality
indices whose aim is to capture the degree of unfair inequalities, pro-
viding complete rankings of distributions. The procedure developed by
the French economists generalizes, in a certain sense, Roemer's con-
cept of EOp. It provides dominance analysis and, as expected, does
not necessarily permit to set up complete rankings, but provides more
robust conclusions, at least in some pair-wise comparisons.
We brie
y present each of them in the next section. Then we assess
some advantages and disadvantages of each methodology.1
2.2 Inequality indices
Extending a previous theoretical contribution (Peragine, 2004b) which
focused on opportunity inequality dominance criteria, Checchi and Per-
agine (2005) design a procedure devoted to producing complete rank-
ings of opportunity inequality. They do so by distinguishing the frac-
tion of inequality which is due to circumstances (unacceptable) and
the fraction of inequality which is due to eort (acceptable), and then
assessing the absolute magnitude and the relative importance of each
of these two kinds of inequality. Sections 1 to 4 in their paper de-
scribe in detail their approach and now we oer a brief explanation,
emphasizing the points which matter more for us.
The rst step is to partition the distribution of an outcome (say, of
test scores) according to two criteria: types and \tranches". Belong to
a given type all the individuals who have similar circumstances (say, the
same family background). Belong to a given tranche all the individuals
(from each type) who sit in the same quantile in the distribution of
the outcome. To Roemer the absolute level of eort is irrelevant, and
it is the eort relative to the individual's type what matters. So all
the individuals who belong to a given tranche are assumed to have
expended a similar degree of eort and, hence, deserve to attain the
same educational level.
In the second step, each observation of scores is replaced by the
arithmetic mean score within a given type and tranche. In other words,
they replace the original prole of scores by an articial prole of scores
in which all the intra-type-and-tranche inequality fades away. The ra-
tionale for doing so is that such within-type-and-tranche inequality is
neither associated with dierential opportunities, nor with dierential
eort. Being irrelevant in Roemer's model, it should be canceled out
in an empirical application. In the \articial" distribution generated
1It should be acknowledged the existence of another branch of this literature, which
tries to split total variance of achievement into circumstance- versus choice-related com-
ponents, based on regression techniques (Devooght, 2004; Cognaux and Gignoux, 2005;
Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Men endez, 2006) and relaxing the assumption of separabil-
ity between eort and circumstances, which is adopted in Roemer's framework. This
insightful set of papers will be explored in our future research.
3thereby, in accordance with Roemer's assumptions, the scores are ex-
clusively a function of the type (previously set by the researcher) and
of the eort (inferred by the researcher from the outcome distribution).
The third step is then to evaluate the overall inequality of the arti-
cially generated distribution, as well as the within-tranches inequality
and the within-types inequality. Within-tranches inequality is inter-
preted as inequality due to dierential opportunity, since the outcomes
of individuals of dierent types, but who belong to the same tranche
(i.e., assumed to have expended similar relative eort), are being com-
pared. In a world of perfect equality of opportunities, there would be
no dierence from one type to another, within each tranche, in the out-
come level obtained. Within-types inequality, in turn, is interpreted as
inequality due to dierential eort, since the outcomes of individuals
of similar types (i.e., those who have similar circumstances), are being
compared.
Concretely, the decomposition of overall inequality of the arti-
cially generated distribution into opportunity-inequality and eort-
inequality is analogous to the decomposition of overall inequality into
between-groups inequality and within-groups inequality. Groups could
be dened both as types or as tranches, and Checchi and Peragine
discuss both possibilities.2 We prefer the tranches approach, which in
our view is closer to Roemer's conception of EOp, and we will only re-
fer to such approach hereafter. According to such tranches approach,
between-groups inequality should be understood as between-tranches
inequality (acceptable); and within-groups inequality should be under-
stood as within-tranches inequality (unacceptable).
In order to decompose inequality, Checchi and Peragine (2005) have
employed a subgroup decomposable index, namely an index belonging
to the generalized entropy class. They have chosen the mean logarith-
mic deviation (MLD), also known as 2
nd Theil's coecient, or as the
generalized entropy index, GE(0). They justify the choice of this index
because of a property it respects, namely, path-independence, which is
useful in the context of their paper.
2.3 Dominance analysis
A contribution by Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005) provides an
alternative framework for comparing distributions in terms of the de-
gree of equality of opportunity they re
ect. Such framework places
itself in the tradition of dominance analysis. Again, we limit ourselves
to a brief explanation here.
Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005) summarize the opportunity
oered to an individual by the distribution of an outcome, s, condi-
tional on her set of circumstances, t, denoted F(sjt). Considering two
groups in a society, F(sjt) and F(sjt0), if F(sjt) second-order stochas-
2The \tranches approach" is stated in their \Denition 2: (...) There is EOp if and
only if all those who exerted the same degree of eort have the same chances of achieving
the objective, regardless of the type." In our view, this approach is closer to Roemer's
conception of EOp than the \types approach" stated in their Denition 1.
4tically dominates F(sjt0), then the situation of the former group is
unambiguously preferred to that of the latter one.3 In such case, since
it is clear that the distribution of one group is preferred to the distribu-
tion of another group, such society presents inequality of opportunity.
Logically then, equality of opportunity is satised only when the
conditional distribution of the outcome of one group does not dom-
inate the conditional distribution of the outcome of another group.
They say that \dening equality of opportunity as non-dominance with
a second order stochastic dominance criterion is equivalent to saying
that an individual choosing among these circumstances is unable to
rank them."(Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy, 2005, p.5). However, two
kinds of equality of opportunity are possible:
1. Weak equality of opportunity: veried whenever it is not the case
that one distribution dominates the other one, and provided that
the cumulative distributive functions of the two groups (or equiv-
alently, their GL curves) cross at least once. The reasoning is the
following: given that they cross, it is not clear from an ex ante
position (i.e., from a `veil of ignorance') if it is better to belong
to type t or to type t0.
2. Strong equality of opportunity: veried whenever it is not the case
that one distribution dominates the other one, and provided that
the cumulative distributive functions of the two groups (or GL
curves) are identical. In this case, any ex ante observer would
have no clue on choosing whether he would prefer to belong to
group t or to group t0.
They claim strong equality of opportunity is a particular case of
the weak equality of opportunity. And they also claim such particu-
lar case corresponds exactly with Roemer's conception of equality of
opportunity.
2.4 Methodological issues: an assessment
The opposition between the two methodologies revives the debate on
specic indices versus dominance procedure. In fact, the advantages
and limits of an approach based on specic indices hold for the `Italian
strategy', while those of the dominance approach hold for the `French
strategy'.
An application of the `Italian strategy' provides us with numbers
(synthetic indices of inequality; fractions of acceptable and of unac-
ceptable inequality), which can be compared within and across regions
or countries. That may be a very useful tool to better understand
particular patterns of inequality in dierent places. For example, we
are able to compare Brazilian gures we calculate here with Italian
gures calculated by Checchi and Peragine (2005). The drawback is
3We slightly modify the notation employed by Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005).
While they use x and s for outcomes and circumstances, respectively, we employ s (for
scores) and t (for types), respectively.
5that in the absence of dominance, we can never be sure whether these
comparisons would be robust to another index. And this is precisely
the greatest advantage of the French approach.
An interesting feature of the `Italian approach' is that it is very
close in spirit to Roemer's conception of EOp, which is an important
reference in the normative literature. While an index such as the one
the `Italian approach' oers is indeed a specic index, it can not be con-
sidered as a fully arbitrary one, given that Roemer's theory/algorithm
it expresses is normatively meaningful.
What we consider in the `Italian approach' to be a departure from
Roemer's original EOp conception - the use of the GE(0) index instead
of one which would be closer in spirit to a maximin across types, such
as GE( 1) - seems to us as being in fact a recommendable change, not
only due to the technical reason raised by Checchi and Peragine (2005),
but also due to two other reasons. The rst one is also somewhat tech-
nical. When advising on how to choose an inequality index, Cowell
(1995, p.65) suggests to take into account what he calls the \discrim-
inatory power of an inequality measure", an idea which is clearly ex-
plained as follows: \if very high inequality aversion is specied, nearly
all income distributions that are encountered will register high mea-
sured inequality, so that it becomes dicult to say whether one is more
unequal than another." An index such as GE(0), without being insen-
sitive with respect to inequality, has potentially more discriminatory
power than a more more `extreme' index such as GE( 1).
There is also a more substantial reason to favor the use of GE(0),
following Moreno-Ternero (2005). In his defense of \a more equitable
proposal for equality of opportunity", while adopting Roemer's algo-
rithm, he refuses to give absolute priority to the worst-o group at
each tranche. In other words, he contests the use of a maximin across
types in favor of another normative position, which would reduce the
weight attributed to the worst-o group, in order to increase the weight
of other groups. The idea underlying his proposal is that, while such
groups are not the worst-o, they might also face diculties in terms
of opportunities, and thus deserve some \help" too. The inequality
index corresponding to maximin in the GE-class would be GE( 1).
An index such as GE(0), in turn, would arguably play the role ex-
pected by Moreno-Ternero, since it places less weight on inequality at
the bottom of the distribution than GE( 1), but still is sensitive to
inequality at the bottom.
One limit of the `Italian procedure' regards its `second step', where
each observation of scores is replaced by the arithmetic mean score
within a given type and tranche, aiming at canceling out irrelevant
inequality. Clearly, that is an arbitrary discrete approximation of the
original continuous distribution. In their paper, Checchi and Peragine
(2005) test the impact of such approximation, by comparing the in-
equality of the original and of the generated distributions, and they
nd out that the impact is very small. (We make the same test in the
empirical section of this paper, reaching a similar result.) However, it
is true that the nal gures of the `Italian procedure' (i.e., those ex-
6pressing opportunity-inequality) obtained both in their study (and in
ours) can be criticized on those grounds. Two paths for future research
seem to be possible. Either studying the systematic impacts, if any, of
dierent approximations (through sensitivity analysis, etc.) and then
selecting the most appropriate among them; or turning to other ap-
proaches, such as the regression-based ones, already mentioned before.
According to the `French approach', Roemer's denition of EOp is
only a particular case of a more general conception of EOp in which
an individual choosing ex ante among dierent circumstances is unable
to rank them (EOp as non-dominance with a second order stochastic
dominance criterion). As we said above, according to them, Roemer's
position corresponds with \strong EOp", a situation in which the CDFs
of every pair of types are identical. For two CDFs to be identical,
the frequency distributions from which the CDFs derive must also be
identical. We do not interpret Roemer's EOp as requiring identical
frequency distributions across every pair of types, at least whenever
we take into account Roemer's second-best compromise (or averaging
formula), cf. Roemer (1998). Indeed, generally, for Roemer's EOp to
hold, outcomes must be identical only in each tranche and not (nec-
essarily) along the whole distribution. Then, in the averaging formula
used to dene the actual EOp allocation rule, the same weight is given
to each tranche (or quantile), such that after the EOp algorithm has
been implemented (i.e., a reallocation of resources has moved soci-
ety into a new situation) the frequency distributions (and thus the
CDFs) of the outcome for each type needs not (necessarily) be iden-
tical. So, while it is true that Roemer's EOp without the averaging
formula would correspond with `strong EOp', Roemer's EOp plus the
averaging formula does not. In any case, whatever the label given to
Roemer's EOp, the `French approach' is a very welcome dominance
procedure for fairness analysis.
The two approaches discussed here are attractive for dierent rea-
sons and useful for dierent objectives. In our view, they can be em-
ployed in complementary ways, given that each will provide contrasted
perspectives on the same issue - of measuring unfair inequalities of test
scores. In the remaining of this chapter, we employ each of them in
turn.
3 Inequality of educational opportunities
in Brazil
3.1 Data, denitions, and descriptive statistics
We use here the SAEB dataset, produced by INEP, a federal autarchy
subordinated to the Ministry of Education4. We report national and
regional descriptive statistics regarding only 2001, math, and 8
th grade,
4Due to space limitation, we refrain from describing in detail the SAEB dataset here.
Detailed information can be found in the INEP webpage: http://www.inep.gov.br/.
7except when we calculate SF, because in such case we need to use data
regarding the three grades.
We need to condition test scores upon individuals' circumstances
(types in Roemer's terminology). One of the types on which we con-
dition scores is pupils' parental education (the highest education level
among parents). Let us mention a few reasons why we use such in-
formation to dene types. First of all, because pupils' parental educa-
tion seems to appropriately play the role of a \relevant circumstance".
Starting with the so-called \Coleman report" (Coleman et al., 1966),
a vast literature in the economics of education has established that
the in
uence of variables related to socio-economic status (SES) on
achievement is considerable. Pupil's parental education typically is
positively correlated to other SES variables (wealth, occupational sta-
tus, type of neighborhood where family lives in, and so on), so it can
be viewed as a variable summarizing SES. The role of SES as a deter-
minant of achievement is particularly strong in Brazil, as have shown
studies based, for example, on SAEB data (Albernaz, Ferreira, and
Franco, 2002). Finally, while not talking about performance in test
scores, but about years of schooling, Cognaux and Gignoux (2005)
usefully remind us that Brazil has one of the lowest intergenerational
educational mobility, reinforcing the evidence that parental education
plays an important in shaping educational opportunities.
Another requirement for a variable to dene a type is that it is
not under control of the individuals, nor subject to manipulations by
them. While the true information on pupil's parental education is not
under control of the individuals (in the sense that it is exogenous to a
particular individual), the value which is reported can be manipulated
by pupils, since often it is a self-reported variable. However, we do
not see why pupils would adopt any kind of strategic behavior in this
respect when answering a questionnaire such as the one accompanying
the SAEB exams. Yet, it should be acknowledged that such variable is
subject to misreporting, a problem self-reported variables are typically
subject to.
Parental education is usually available in test scores datasets, as
well as in other datasets, which ensures comparability. For example,
in the specic case of the empirical application we undertake here, we
are able to compare our results to those coming from a similar study
made using Italian data. In the future, we could also reproduce the
exercise using PISA, and other national and international datasets,
producing thereby comparable results, which would be helpful to put
in perspective the ones we provide in this chapter.
Pupils' parental education is thus a good candidate for a \relevant
circumstance", since it has a great in
uence on the outcome of pupils,
it is often available, and for practical matters it is not under control of
pupils.
In Table 1 are reported some descriptive statistics on scores at
both the national and the regional level. We observe in Panel A the
descriptive statistics concerning the pooled sample. Panel B shows the
statistics for the sub-sample of observations for which information on
8Table 1: Checking impact of missing information.
Panel A: Pooled sample
Region Mean Score Std. Dev. Obs. Freq.
North 231.86 42.44 7,972 188,469
North-East 228.79 46.13 20,166 800,674
South-East 249.72 51.83 8,672 1,379,759
South 255.34 45.96 6,251 397,108
Mid-West 244.83 45.76 7,239 236,262
Brazil 243.38 49.62 50,300 3,002,272
Panel B: Subsample with missing information on parents' education
Region Mean Score Std. Dev. Obs. Freq.
North 219.88 36.72 559 14,623
North-East 217.48 41.27 1,671 71,163
South-East 230.4 46.00 636 102,581
South 241.54 39.52 383 25,945
Mid-West 231.59 39.08 499 19,022
Brazil 227.13 43.49 3,748 233,334
9parental education is missing. There is missing information concerning
3,748 observations out of a total of 50,300, which represents 7.45% of
the total (or 7.77% of the weighted observations). Another important
feature we can read in this table is that the average score obtained by
the pooled sample (243.38) is higher than the average score obtained
by the sub-sample (227.13, which corresponds to 93.32% of the pooled
sample's average score).5 It is not surprising that pupils who are not
able to report their parents' education obtain lower scores than those
who are able to do so. From now on, we only use the 46,552 obser-
vations for which we have information on parents' education, but the
slight bias mentioned here should be acknowledged.
In Table 2 we can observe descriptive statistics of scores, by region
and by type of pupil. The national average score for the valid obser-
vations is 244:75, with standard deviation 49:86. The 46;552 valid ob-
servations expand to 2;768;938 pupils with the sample weights.6 The
most populated region is by far the South-East (1;277;178 weighted
observations), more than seven times larger than the least populated
region (North, with 173;846 weighted observations).
As parents' education increase, average scores increase too, both
in the national level (ranging from 213:11 to 286:52) and inside each
region. The ranking of regions in terms of average scores is as follows: S
 SE  MW  N  NE. This overall ranking varies slightly according
to the type we turn to. For example, among kids with highly-educated
parents (college), the ranking is: SE  S  MW  NE  N, while
the ranking among kids with poorly educated parents (lacking formal
education) is: MW  SE  S  N  NE.
3.2 Specic inequality indices
In this section are reported results obtained regarding Brazilian ed-
ucational data, following the procedure exposed in section 2.2 and
previously applied by Checchi and Peragine (2005) to Italian data.
3.2.1 Preliminary checks
The rst step is to check how scores vary according to quantiles (deciles
here) and to pupils' types (their parents' education here), which is
shown at the country level in Table 3. For a given type, we observe
similar frequencies across deciles.7 We also observe that, at any given
decile, scores increase with the type (as we move from the top to the
5The same pattern is observed for regions' statistics. The fraction of missing observa-
tions ranges from 6.13% in the South to 8.29% in the North-East; while the ratio between
sub-sample average scores and pooled-sample average scores ranges from 92.26% in the
South-East to 95.06% in the North-East.
6In fact, the 46;552 valid observations expand to 2;768;938:40, but we omit the deci-
mals in this table and in the remaining ones.
7Frequencies are similar, but not equal, from the construction of the per-type deciles
(in terms of weighted frequencies, and not in terms of observations) and the discrete nature
of scores (with continuous data, we would have identical frequencies).
10Table 2: Descriptive statistics related to pupil's mother's education.




N NE SE S MW
216.68 207.40 217.91 216.94 224.89 213.11
36.41 35.12 34.09 41.12 39.26 36.03
7,516 61,937 39,905 8,106 8,845 126,309
253 1,170 188 76 182 1,869
Lower Prim.
223.51 216.95 234.15 243.03 229.88 229.29
37.49 37.79 41.71 40.68 38.20 40.98
42,967 234,858 358,861 99,650 56,536 792,873
1,537 4,600 1,429 1,014 1,169 9,749
Upper Prim.
227.07 224.60 238.58 248.11 237.43 235.85
39.45 39.79 44.03 41.20 39.55 42.72
45,317 182,362 362,977 110,756 62,813 764,224
1,668 3,895 1,710 1,290 1,531 10,094
Secondary
238.48 241.83 259.68 262.75 253.49 253.28
41.84 46.60 50.91 44.64 44.05 48.58
54,104 173,069 295,437 93,295 54,752 670,657
2,337 5,081 2,127 1,561 1,728 12,834
College
253.00 273.05 294.93 289.17 281.71 286.52
51.43 57.11 54.84 47.83 51.69 55.15
23,942 77,286 219,998 59,356 34,294 414,876
1,618 3,749 2,582 1,927 2,130 12,006
Total
232.87 229.90 251.28 256.31 245.99 244.75
42.73 46.43 51.97 46.23 46.12 49.86
173,846 729,512 1,277,178 371,163 217,240 2,768,938
7,413 18,495 8,036 5,868 6,740 46,552
11Table 3: Scores according to types and deciles. (Table continues in the next
page...)
Means, Standard Deviations, Frequencies and Number of Observations of Score
Parents'
Education Decile Total
1 2 3 4 5
158:34 176:95 186:97 195:71 203:95 213:11
No Formal 8:13 4:02 2:96 2:28 2:35 36:03
12;648 12;652 12;766 12;461 12;637 126;309
187 170 164 148 175 1;869
165.19 185.39 198.16 210.58 221.74 229.29
Lower 9.50 4.01 3.43 3.70 2.95 40.98
Primary 79;350 79;718 78;916 79;224 79;246 792;873
1,025 948 1,022 1,13 972 9,749
166.59 189.35 203.78 216.81 228.20 235.85
Upper 10.44 4.41 4.07 3.48 3.16 42.72
Primary 76;595 76;534 76;140 76;543 77;293 764;224
944 967 1,089 996 948 10,094
174.95 200.45 217.38 231.40 244.45 253.28
Secondary 11.73 5.84 4.20 3.75 3.92 48.58
67;072 67;235 67;149 66;934 67;017 670;657
1,084 1,196 1;110 1,121 1,269 12,834
188.42 223.98 246.35 265.79 282.52 286.52
College 16.07 7.25 5.95 5.34 4.23 55.15
41;499 42;653 40;336 41;497 41;552 414;876
861 925 1,055 1,232 1,214 12,006
171.10 195.63 210.95 224.95 237.30 244.75
Total 14.23 14.57 17.30 19.78 21.75 49.86
277;164 278;792 275;307 276;659 277,745 2,768,938
4,101 4,206 4,44 4,627 4,578 46,552
12Table 3: (...Continued from previous page)
Means, Standard Deviations, Frequencies and Number of Observations of Score
Parents'
Education Decile Total
6 7 8 9 10
213.51 223.85 236.06 254.11 282.71 213.11
No Formal 3.08 3.33 4.12 6.13 17.33 36.03
12;644 12;627 13;182 12;075 12;615 126;309
186 206 196 216 221 1,869
232.88 244.45 256.73 271.62 306.51 229.29
Lower 3.40 3.23 3.74 5.37 21.11 40.98
Primary 79;330 79;342 79;174 79;787 78;786 792;873
1,012 907 881 932 920 9,749
240.05 252.90 267.00 282.06 312.07 235.85
Upper 3.51 4.04 4.16 4.73 19.44 42.72
Primary 75;432 76;463 76;480 76;414 76;330 764;224
1,079 1,076 992 870 1,133 10,094
258.22 271.68 286.91 305.65 341.97 253.28
Secondary 3.93 3.66 5.09 6.42 20.28 48.58
66;988 67;152 67;094 67;015 67;001 670;657
1,328 1,266 1,376 1,369 1,715 12,834
297.19 312.07 326.88 345.81 376.92 286.52
College 3.73 4.28 4.44 6.94 13.29 55.15
41;442 41;542 41;407 41;466 41;482 414;876
1,134 1,408 1,468 1,441 1,268 12,006
249.77 262.58 276.35 293.10 326.14 244.75
Total 23.16 24.28 25.26 26.85 32.71 49.86
275;837 277;126 277;337 276;758 276;2152;768;938
4,739 4,863 4,913 4,828 5,257 46,552
13bottom of the table). We conrm thereby a pattern which was ex-
pected.8
Another check we have undertaken, following Checchi and Peragine
(2005), is a comparison of the original distribution and the articially
generated distribution (the one which cancels out the within-tranche-
and-type inequality). The results of this check (not reported here)
show the transformation does not aect inequality very much, since
the ratio between the inequality - according to GE(0) - of the two
distributions is always around 1, both at the national level, and for
each region.
3.2.2 Main results
The main results of this section are reported in Table 4, in which
we observe the decomposition of overall inequality into opportunity-
inequality and eort-inequality.
Based on the parameters we have used, which express a very parsi-
monious denition of circumstances, we immediately observe two im-
portant rankings - columns A and A/C - which equally rank Brazil's
regions: N (smaller inequality and smaller fraction)  S  MW  NE
 SE (large inequality and larger fraction).
In terms of magnitude of inequality of opportunity, the result for
Brazil's fairest region (North, 0:0009449) is comparable with Italy's
results. Inequality of opportunity in that region is 33.27% larger than
that of Italy's fairest region (Northern Italy, 0:000709) and 30.91%
smaller than that of Italy's unfairest region (Center-Southern Italy,
0:0013677). Thus, those results place Northern Brazil in an interme-
diary situation between the two Italian regions.
However, when we turn to the second fairest region in Brazil (South,
0:0020801), inequality of opportunity is already much more substan-
tial: 52.08% more than Italy's unfairest region. Brazil's unfairest re-
gion shows a level of inequality of opportunity (South-East, 0:0037840)
which is 176.67% larger than that of Italy's unfairest region (Center-
Southern Italy, 0:0013677) and 433.71% larger than that of Italy's
fairest region (Northern Italy, 0:000709). So, with the exception of
the North, unfairness is much greater in Brazilian regions than in the
Italian regions. Considering that only a small fraction of Brazilian
pupils study in the Northern region (6.28% of the nal weighted sam-
ple we used) the overall picture is one of considerable inequality of
opportunity in Brazil.
The fraction of inequality which is due to dierential opportunity
amounts to 16.07% of overall inequality in Brazil, and we observe sub-
stantial variation across regions. The North is the least unequal one
with 5.66%, while the South-East is the most unequal one with 18.06%
of overall inequality due to inequality of opportunity.
8We have also made the same calculations for each region. The same pattern observed
at the national level is veried, with a few violations of the monotonicity of scores with
types: (i) region=SE, decile=1, types= 1, 2, 3; (ii) region=S, decile=1, types= 2, 3; (iii)
region=MW, decile=6, types= 1,2.
14Table 4: Decomposing inequality into opportunity and eort inequality
Inequality Percentage
...of opportunity ...of eort Overall Opportunity/Overall
(A) (B) (C) (A/C)
Brazil 0.0032685 0.0170664 0.0203350 16:07%
North 0.0009449 0.0157431 0.0166879 5:66%
North-East 0.0029423 0.0164729 0.0194152 15:15%
South-East 0.0037840 0.0171662 0.0209502 18:06%
South 0.0020801 0.0145051 0.0165852 12:54%
Mid-West 0.0024914 0.0147000 0.0171914 14:49%
Inequality of eort is comparable across regions (column C), rang-
ing from 0:0145051 (South) to 0:0171662 (South-East), with a national
level of 0:0170664. These levels of eort inequality are not consider-
ably dierent from the range found by Checchi and Peragine (2005),
namely, 0:0126289 in Northern Italy and 0:0174451 in Center-Southern
Italy. So the dierence in the magnitude of scores inequality between
Italy and Brazil is essentially due to opportunity-inequality, and not
to eort-inequality.
3.3 Dominance analysis
In this section, using Brazilian educational data, we apply the proce-
dure exposed in section 2.3, and which has been previously applied
by Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005) to international data on in-
comes.
According to Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005) the opportu-
nities oered to an individual of a given type are summarized by the
CDF of her type. By plotting CDFs of dierent types we can verify, for
every pair of CDFs, whether there is inequality of opportunity (curves
do not cross), weak equality of opportunity (curves cross) or strong
equality of opportunity (curves are identical).
We recall that, adapting to our purposes the notation dened by
Pistolesi, Lefranc, and Trannoy (2005), we set the conditional scores
function as F(sjt), where s stands for individual pupils' score, as usual,
and T stands for type. Type is dened as ve categories of pupils'
parental education. Since we are using exactly the same data as in the
previous section, refer to Tables 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics.9
9In the CDFs graphics, we use the label isced for parental education level, and we have:
isced1: no formal education; isced2: lower primary education; isced3: upper primary
education; isced4: secondary education; isced5: college education.
153.3.1 Main results
Figure 1 depicts the CDFs for the 5 types of pupils in Brazil. We
can observe that the higher the level of parents' education (isced5) the
better is the performance of pupils. There is no crossing, which means
that we are in a situation of inequality of opportunity, for any pair of
types we look at. We can observe, though, that the gap across types
is not uniform. For example, the dierence from the curve associated
with parents having higher education (isced5) and that of parents hav-
ing high-school certicate (isced4) is larger than the dierence between
the curves associated with isced4 and isced3. The largest dierences
are to be found between the two highest performing types of pupils
(isced5 and isced4) and between the two lowest performing types of
pupils (isced2 and isced1). The same pattern is reproduced almost
exactly at each of the 5 macro-regions (regional graphs not reported
here).
Figure 1: CDFs, with parents' education (isced) dening types
We still have to check whether these results resist statistical in-
ference tests (in our plans for future research), especially whether the
types isced2 and isced3 are not in a situation of strong equality of
opportunity.
3.3.2 An alternative denition of types
We have repeated the exercise using an alternative denition of types:
pupil's skin color. Which denition of types - in terms of skin color, of
parental education, or of a combination of the two - represents a more
legitimate denition of types is an open question, which has recently
given rise to an intense debate in Brazil concerning the legitimacy of
armative action policies for higher education. An armative action
policy for higher education would certainly benet relatively well-o
non-white individuals (those who would have surpassed uncountable
obstacles to reach the more advanced levels of the Brazilian educa-
tional system). While it may be legitimate to grant access to college
to non-whites in order to ensure the emergence of diversity among
the elite - with possible positive eects, for example, in terms of en-
hanced motivation for non-white children, and so on -, if the objective
is to actually improve opportunities for a larger fraction of non-whites,
armative action policies would have to be implemented in much ear-
lier stages of the schooling system, possibly at primary school. The
objective of the exercise here is simply to contribute to such debate,
diagnosing whether inequality of opportunity in terms of skin color can
be identied in test scores data, that is, when individuals are still at
school.
The variable we employ here originates from a choice made by
pupils for dening their skin color themselves, among 5 possible cate-
gories: white, mixed, black, Asian, native-Brazilian. Descriptive statis-
tics regarding this variable in its relation with scores are reported in
16Table 5: Descriptive statistics related to pupils' skin color
Means, Standard Deviations, Frequencies and Number of Observations of Score
Race Region Brazil
N NE SE S MW
White
234.74 231.22 260.57 259.67 250.36 252.93
45.36 49.47 53.35 46.88 48.64 52.07
57,976 260,924 667,992 278,067 99,225 1,364,183
2,742 6,887 4,482 4,668 3,494 22,273
Mixed
230.81 227.91 239.56 244.53 242.54 235.55
39.99 44.14 46.73 41.48 43.41 45.13
92,400 367,518 476,853 78,521 89,581 1,104,874
3,733 8,947 2,642 964 2,476 18,762
Black
225.94 221.09 225.11 240.60 230.13 225.24
44.29 40.83 41.33 44.25 38.33 41.56
12,542 83,869 112,775 16,933 19,292 245,411
456 1,875 668 253 457 3,709
Asian
242.13 241.46 259.29 255.77 247.69 251.68
43.26 49.31 58.50 43.93 43.50 53.11
13,847 50,244 86,226 15,363 18,263 183,943
637 1,500 592 233 550 3,512
Native
226.34 229.88 246.39 251.64 239.82 238.23
38.30 43.46 42.60 32.74 43.99 42.88
7,371 22,368 25,769 4,019 6,324 65,852
271 611 206 81 173 1,342
Total
232.39 229.20 249.99 255.59 245.17 243.75
42.39 46.17 51.83 45.99 45.72 49.62
184,137 784,923 1,369,614 392,903 232,686 2,964,262
7,839 19,820 8,590 6,199 7,150 49,598
17Table 5. There is less missing information on pupils' self-reported skin
color (702) than on parents' education (3748), which turns to be an
advantage of dening types on the basis of skin color over dening
them on the basis of parental education.10 One characteristic of this
denition is that the groups (types) created this way are too dierent
in terms of size: while whites and mixed together amount to 82.74% of
the total population, native-Brazilians are only 2.71% of the total, and
blacks and Asians amount to less than 8% each. In some regions, the
presence of some types is negligible. For example, the sum of blacks
(4.08%), Asians (3.76%) and native-Brazilians (1.31%) amounts to less
than 10% in the South, while in that same region 3=4 of pupils report
themselves as being white.
An interesting result with this new denition of types is that clearcut
situations of both kinds are found: equality and inequality of op-
portunity. In fact, we nd: (i) equality of opportunity (at least in
the weak sense) between whites and Asians, and between mixed and
native-Brazilians, and (ii) inequality of opportunity between blacks
and any other group, and between the pair mixed/native and the pair
white/Asians.
Figure 2: CDFs, with self-reported skin color dening types
Although such results should be veried by statistical inference,
they lead us to provisionally conclude that there is inequality of op-
portunity for achievement in terms of skin color in Brazil.
4 Final remarks
In the methodological sections of this chapter, we discuss advantages
and limits of two alternative methodologies which can be used for mea-
suring and comparing inequality of educational opportunities, both of
which are based on, or try to go beyond, Roemer (1998).
The dominance analysis reveals a situation of evident inequality
of opportunity when types are dened in terms of parental education,
while when types are dened in terms of skin color we obtain both in-
equality of opportunity and (at least weak) equality of opportunity, de-
pending on the types we compare. The specic indices approach show
that inequality of opportunity represents 16.07% of overall inequal-
ity in Brazil, and we observe large variation across regions. Brazil's
most opportunity-unequal region (South-East) is 176.67% more un-
equal than Italy's most opportunity-unequal region (Center-South) and
433.71% more so than Italy's least opportunity-unequal region (North).
Various, alternative, specications can be tested and a series of
improvements can be implemented to both applications (we have men-
tioned a few in the text). It is also possible to deepen our analysis
focusing on particular sub-national units, in order for our results to be
10We have no information on the reliability of those two self-reported variables.
18more useful for policy use. We plan to accomplish those tasks in the
close future.
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